Abstract. We investigate quantified interpreted systems, a computationally grounded semantics for a first-order temporal epistemic logic on linear time. We report a completeness result for the monodic fragment of a language that includes LTL modalities as well as distributed and common knowledge. We exemplify possible uses of the formalism by analysing message passing systems, a typical framework for distributed systems, in a first-order setting.
Introduction
Propositional modal logics to reason about knowledge and time have been thoroughly investigated by researchers in logic and artificial intelligence both as regards their fundamental theoretical properties (completeness, decidability, complexity) [3, 8, 10] , as well as their suitability for the specification and verification of multi-agent systems [5, 21, 31] .
In one line of research epistemic modalities have been added to represent group knowledge such as distributed and common knowledge [9, 11] . In another one, the temporal fragment has been modified according to different models of time (e.g., linear or branching, discrete or continuous) [17, 19] . In yet another line, temporal epistemic logic has been studied within a first order setting [1, 6, 15] .
In this paper we extend a combination of epistemic and temporal logic to the predicate level. We provide this language with a computationally grounded semantics [30] given in terms of quantified interpreted systems [1, 2] , and we present a sound and complete axiomatisation of the monodic fragment of this logic, where at most one free variable appears in the scope of any modal operator. Finally, we apply this formalism to the modeling of message passing systems, a typical framework in distributed systems [18, 5] .
Our starting point is a number of results by Hodkinson, Wolter, and Zakharyaschev, among others, regarding the axiomatisability [25, 29] , decidability [15, 28] , and complexity [13, 14] of first-order modal logics, including both positive [12, 24] and negative results [16, 26, 27] . Specifically, we prove the completeness of our first-order temporal epistemic logic via a quasimodel construction. These structures have been introduced in [15] to prove decidability for monodic fragments of first-order temporal logic (FOTL) on a variety of flows of time. These investigations were further pursued in [16] , where branching flows of time are analysed, and in [12] , which deals with the packed fragment of FOTL. In [13, 14] the complexity of the decision problem for a number of monodic fragments of FOTL is considered.
The formulas φ and φUφ ′ are read as "φ holds at the next step" and "φ ′ will eventually hold and φ is the case until that moment". The formula K i φ represents "agent i knows φ", while formulas Dφ and Cφ respectively mean "φ is distributed knowledge" and "φ is common knowledge" in the group A of agents.
We define the symbols ∧, ∨, ↔, ∃, G (always in the future), and F (some time in the future) as standard; whileK i φ andDφ are shorthands for ¬K i ¬φ and ¬D¬φ respectively. Further, Eφ = i∈A K i φ, and for △ equal to E or , △ k φ is defined as follows for every k ∈ N: △ 0 φ = φ and △ k+1 φ = △△ k φ.
Finally, by φ[ y] we mean that y = y 1 , . . . , y n are all the free variables in φ; while φ[ y/ t] is the formula obtained by substituting simultaneously some, possibly all, free occurrences of y in φ with t = t 1 , . . . , t n , renaming bounded variables if necessary.
Quantified Interpreted Systems
In this section we present a dynamic version of the "static" quantified interpreted systems in [2] by assuming the natural numbers N as the underlying flow of time. Specifically, for each agent i ∈ A in a multi-agent system we introduce a set L i of local states l i , l ′ i , . . ., and a set Act i of actions a i , a ′ i , . . .. We consider local states and actions for the environment e as well. The set S ⊆ L e × L 1 × . . . × L m contains the global states of the MAS, while Act ⊆ Act e × Act 1 × . . . × Act m is the set of joint actions. We also introduce a transition function τ : Act → (S → S). Intuitively, τ (a)(s) = s ′ encodes that agents access the global state s ′ from s by performing the joint action a. We say that the global state s ′ is reachable in one step from s, or s ⊏ s ′ , iff there is a ∈ Act such that τ (a)(s) = s ′ .
To represent the temporal evolution of the MAS we consider the flow of time N, < of natural numbers N with the strict total order <. A run r over S, Act, τ, N is a function from N to S such that r(n) ⊏ r(n + 1). Intuitively, a run represents a possible evolution of the MAS according to the transition function τ and assuming N as the flow of time. We now define the quantified interpreted systems for the language L m as follows:
Definition 3.1. (QIS)
A quantified interpreted system over S, Act, τ, N is a triple P = R, D, I such that:
(i) R is a non-empty set of runs over S, Act, τ, N ;
(ii) D is a non-empty set of individuals; (iii) I is an interpretation of L m such that I(c) ∈ D, and for r ∈ R, n ∈ N, I(P k , r, n) is a k-ary relation on D.
We denote by QIS the class of all quantified interpreted systems.
Note that the individual constants in L m are interpreted rigidly, that is, their interpretation is the same in every global state. Following standard notation [5] a pair (r, n) is a point in P. If r(n) = l e , l 1 , . . . , l m is the global state at the point (r, n), then r e (n) = l e and r i (n) = l i are the environment's and agent i's local state at (r, n) respectively. Further, a QIS is synchronous if for every i ∈ A, r i (n) = r ′ i (n ′ ) implies n = n ′ , that is, time is part of the local state of any agent. We denote by QIS sync the class of all synchronous QIS. Now we assign a meaning to the formulas of L m in quantified interpreted systems. Let σ be an assignment from the variables to the individuals in D, the valuation I σ (t) of a term t is defined as σ(y) for t = y, and I σ (t) = I(c) for t = c. A variant σ x a of an assignment σ assigns a ∈ D to x and coincides with σ on all the other variables. Definition 3.2. The satisfaction relation |= for φ ∈ L m , (r, n) ∈ P, and an assignment σ is defined as follows:
The truth conditions for ∧, ∨, ↔, ∃, G, and F are defined from those above. A formula φ ∈ L m is true at a point (r, m) iff it is satisfied at (r, m) by every σ; φ is valid on a QIS P iff it is true at every point in P; φ is valid on a class C of QIS iff it is valid on every QIS in C.
The monodic fragment
In the rest of the paper we focus on the monodic fragment of the language L m .
m is the set of formulas φ ∈ L m such that any subformula of φ of the form K i ψ, Dψ, Cψ, ψ, or ψ 1 Uψ 2 contains at most one free variable.
The monodic fragments of a number of first-order modal logics have been thoroughly investigated [14, 15, 25, 28, 29] . In the case of L m this fragment is quite expressive as it contains formulas like the following:
Formula (1) states that it is common knowledge that every resource will eventually be requested, but until that time the resource remains universally available. Formula (2) represents that if it is distributed knowledge that at the next step any resource is not available whenever it is requested, then at the next step it is distributed knowledge that this is the case. However, note that the formula
which intuitively means that agent i knows that every process will eventually try to access every resource, is not monodic. Still, the monodic fragment of L m is quite expressive as it contains all de dicto formulas, i.e., formulas where no free variable appears in the scope of modal operators, as in (2).
Message Passing Systems
In this section we model message passing systems [5, 18] in the framework of QIS. A message passing system (MPS) is a MAS in which the only actions for the agents are sending and receiving messages. This setting is common to a variety of distributed systems, well beyond the realms of MAS and AI. Indeed, any synchronous or asynchronous networked system can be seen as an MPS. To define our message passing QIS we introduce a set Msg of messages µ 1 , µ 2 , . . ., and define the local state l i for agent i as a history over Msg, that is, a sequence of events of the form send(i, j, µ) and rec(i, j, µ) for i, j ∈ A, µ ∈ Msg. Intuitively, send(i, j, µ) represents the event in which agent i sends message µ to j, while the meaning of rec(i, j, µ) is that agent i receives message µ from j. A global state s ∈ S is a tuple l e , l 1 , . . . , l n where l 1 , . . . , l n are local states as above, and l e contains all the events in l 1 , . . . , l n .
A run r over S, N is a function from the natural numbers N to S such that:
MP1 r i (0) is a sequence of length zero, and r i (m + 1) is either identical to r i (m) or results from appending an event to r i (m).
By MP1 the local state of each agent records the messages she has sent or received, and at each step at most a single event occurs to any agent. We define message passing QIS (MPQIS) as the class of quantified interpreted systems P = R, D, I where R is a non-empty set of runs satisfying MP1, D contains the agents in A and the messages in Msg, and I is an interpretation for L m . We use the same notation for objects in the model and syntactic elements, the distinction will be made clear by the context.
For the specification of MPS we introduce a predicative letter Send such that (P σ , r, n) |= Send(i, j, µ) iff event send(i, j, µ) occurs to agent i at time n in run r, i.e., r i (n) is the result of appending send(i, j, µ) to r i (n − 1). Also, we introduce the predicate Sent such that (P σ , r, n) |= Sent(i, j, µ) iff event send(i, j, µ) occurs to agent i before time n in run r, i.e., send(i, j, µ) appears in r i (n). The predicates Rec and Rec'ed are similarly defined for event rec(i, j, µ).
Let us now explore the range of specifications that can be expressed in this formalism. A property often required in MPS is channel reliability. We express this by stating that every sent message is eventually received. Note that, according to the definition of message passing QIS, it is possible that a message is lost during a run of the system. We can force channel reliability by requiring the following specification to hold on MPQIS:
In fact, we can be more specific and require that every message is received at most (at least) k steps after being sent, or exactly k steps after being sent:
Note that all of (4)- (7) are monodic. In these specifications the identities of the sender and the receiver are left unspecified. So, in cases in which we are not interested in singling out the addresser and the addressee, the monodic fragment suffices.
Another property often required on MPQIS is that there are no "ghost" messages: if agent i receives a message µ, then i knows that µ must actually have been sent by some agent j. This specification is expressible as a monodic formula:
We compare (8) with a further relevant property of MPQIS, i.e., authentication: if agent i receives a message µ from agent j, then i knows that µ has actually been sent by j. This specification can be expressed as the de re version of (8):
Note that, differently from (8), (9) is not monodic. Even if we allow an agent i not to know whether a received message µ has actually been sent, that is, we reject (8), it can be checked on arbitrary MPQIS that the following formula holds:
In other words, it is distributed knowledge that a message µ has been sent and received as soon as it has been received. On the other hand, the corresponding monodic formulas
are not valid for any agent i, j. Furthermore, in L 1 m we can express that an agent i cannot aquire the knowledge that message µ has been sent to her, other than by receiving the message:
Finally, we might want to check whether at a certain point in the evolution of the MPQIS it will be common knowledge that a message has been sent or received:
From results in [5] regarding the attainability of common knowledge in systems with unreliable communication, we may infer that some assumption on channel reliability in MPQIS is needed in order to validate specifications (10) and (11) .
The conclusion we draw from the observations above is that the monodic fragment of the language L m allows for rich specifications on MPS, notwithstanding the limitation on free variables in modal contexts.
Axiomatisation
In this section we present a sound and complete axiomatisation of the set of monodic validities in the class of quantified interpreted systems. This result shows that, even though language L 1 m is highly expressive, QIS provide a perfectly adequate semantics for it. This also opens the possibility of developing automated verification methods for this formalism.
The The operators K i , D, and C are S5 modalities, while the next and until U operators are axiomatised as linear-time modalities. To this we add the classic postulates Ex and Gen for quantification, which are both sound as we are considering a unique domain D of individuals for each QIS. We consider the standard definitions of proof and theorem: ⊢ φ means that φ ∈ L 1 m is a theorem in QKT 1 m . It is a routine exercise to check that the axioms of QKT 1 m are valid on every QIS and the inference rules preserve validity. As a consequence, we have the following soundness result:
Theorem 5.1. (Soundness)
The system QKT 1 m is sound with respect to the class QIS of quantified interpreted systems.
The next corollary directly follows from the fact that QIS sync is a subset of QIS.
Corollary 5.1. (Soundness)
The system QKT 1 m is sound with respect to the class QIS sync of synchronous QIS.
Now we show that the axioms in QKT 1 m are not only necessary, but also sufficient to prove all monodic validities on QIS and QIS sync .
Kripke Models
Although quantified interpreted systems are useful for modeling MAS, to prove the completeness of QKT 1 m we first introduce an appropriate class of Kripke models, and prove completeness for these models. Then we apply a correspondence result between Kripke models and QIS to obtain the desired result.
Definition 5.2. A Kripke model for L m is a tuple
(i) for j ∈ J, N j is a copy of the natural numbers with the strict total order < j ;
(ii) for i ∈ A, ∼ i is an equivalence relation on j∈J N j ; (iii) D is a non-empty set of individuals; (iv) the interpretation I is such that I(c) ∈ D, and for n j ∈ N j , I(P k , n j ) is a k-ary relation on D.
The class of all Kripke models is denoted by K.
A Kripke model is synchronous if for every i ∈ A, n j ∼ i n ′ j ′ implies n = n ′ . By K sync we denote the class of all synchronous Kripke models. The satisfaction relation |= for an assignment σ is inductively defined as follows:
where ( i∈A ∼ i ) * is the reflexive and transitive closure of the relation ( i∈A ∼ i ).
We compare Kripke models and quantified interpreted systems by means of a map g : K → QIS. Let M = N j , < j j∈J , {∼ i } i∈A , D, I be a Kripke model. For every equivalence relation ∼ i , for n j ∈ N j , let the equivalence class [n j ] ∼ i = {n ′ j ′ | n j ∼ i n ′ j ′ } be a local state for agent i, while N j is the set of local states for the environment. Then define g(M) as the tuple R, D, I ′ where R contains the runs r j for j ∈ J such that r j (n) = n j , [n j ] ∼ 1 , . . . , [n j ] ∼m , D is the same as in M, and I ′ (P k , r j , n) = I(P k , n j ). The structure g(M) is a QIS that satisfies the following result:
We omit the proof of this lemma, which can be easily proved by induction on the lenght of φ. Note that if M is synchronous, then also g(M) is synchronous, i.e., g also defines a map from K sync to QIS sync .
Completeness
The completeness of the system QKT 1 m with respect to the classes QIS and QIS sync of quantified interpreted systems is proved by means of a quasimodel construction [6] . In particular, the version of quasimodels here considered combines the purely epistemic structures in [25] with the purely temporal structures in [29] . Intuitively, a quasimodel for a monodic formula φ ∈ L 1 m is a relational structure whose points are sets of sets of subformulas of φ. Each set of sets of subformulas describes a "possible state of affairs", and contains sets of subformulas defining the individuals in the point. In what follows we provide the exact definitions. Definition 6.1. Given a formula φ ∈ L 1 n we denote by subφ the set of subformulas of φ, and define
Let sub n φ be the subset of sub C φ containing formulas with at most n free variables and let x be a variable not occurring in φ, we define sub x φ = {ψ[y/x] | ψ[y] ∈ sub 1 φ}. Clearly, x is the only free variable in sub x φ. By conφ we denote the set of all constants occurring in φ.
Definition 6.2. (Type)
A type for φ is any subset t of sub x φ such that for every ψ, χ ∈ sub x φ, (i) ψ ∧ χ ∈ t iff ψ ∈ t and χ ∈ t; and (ii) ¬ψ ∈ t iff ψ / ∈ t.
This definition of type is completely standard [6, 25, 29] . In what follows we do not distinguish between a type t and the conjunction ψ∈t ψ of its formulas. Note that sub 0 φ is the set of sentences in sub x φ. Two types t, t ′ agree on sub 0 φ iff t ∩ sub 0 φ = t ′ ∩ sub 0 φ, i.e., they share the same set of sentences. Finally, given a type t for φ and a constant c ∈ conφ, the pair t, c is called an indexed type for φ.
The following definition of state candidate is also standard.
Definition 6.3. (State Candidate)
Let T be a set of types for φ that agree on sub 0 φ, and T con a set containing for each c ∈ conφ an indexed type t, c such that t ∈ T , then the pair C = T, T con is a state candidate for φ.
Given a state candidate C = T, T con we define the formula α C as follows:
Note that α C is monodic. A state candidate C is consistent iff the formula α C is consistent with QKT 1 m , i.e., ¬α C . Consistent state candidates will be the points of our quasimodel. We now define a relation of suitability for types and state candidates that constitute the relational part of our quasimodel.
Definition 6.4.
1. A pair (t 1 , t 2 ) of types is -suitable iff the formula t 1 ∧ t 2 is consistent. A pair (t 1 , t 2 ) is i-suitable iff the formula t 1 ∧K i t 2 is consistent, and it is D-suitable iff the formula t 1 ∧D¬t 2 is consistent.
is consistent, and it is D-suitable iff the formula α C 1 ∧Dα C 2 is consistent.
We now introduce the frame underlying the quasimodel for φ.
Definition 6.5. (Frame)
Let A + = A ∪ {D}. A frame F is a tuple N j , < j j∈J , {≺ l } l∈A + such that:
(i) for j ∈ J, each N j is a copy of the natural numbers with the strict total order < j ;
(ii) the pair j∈J N j , l∈A + ≺ l is a set of disjoint intransitive trees 1 .
A frame is synchronous if for every l ∈ A + , n j ≺ l n ′ j ′ implies n = n ′ . Further, we introduce state functions mapping points in F to consistent state candidates.
Definition 6.6. (State Function)
A state function for φ over F is a map f associating with each n j ∈ F a consistent state candidate f(n j ) = C n j for φ such that:
(i) the domain of f is not empty;
(ii) if f is defined on n j then f is defined on n + 1 j ; (iii) if f is defined on n j and n j ≺ l n ′ j ′ then f is defined on n ′ j ′ . In what follows we often do not distinguish between a state n j and its associated state candidate f(n j ) = C n j .
Finally, we provide the definition of objects, which correspond to the runs in [25, 29] . We use this denomination to avoid confusion with the runs in QIS. 1 The pair U, R is an intransitive tree iff (i) there is a root u0 ∈ U such that u0R * u for every u ∈ U , where R * is the reflexive and transitive closure of R; (ii) for every u ∈ U the set {u ′ ∈ U | u ′ R * u} is finite and linearly ordered by R * ; (iii) every u ∈ U but the root u0 has exactly one predecessor; (iv) the root u0 is irreflexive.
Definition 6.7. (Object)
Let f be a state function for φ over F. An object in F, f is a map ρ associating with every n j ∈ Dom(f) a type ρ(n j ) in T n j such that:
A map ρ associating with every n j ∈ Dom(f) a type ρ(n j ) ∈ T n j such that only conditions (i) and (iii) hold is a temporal object. Similarly, a map ρ associating with every n j ∈ Dom(f) a type ρ(n j ) ∈ T n j such that only conditions (ii) and (iv)-(vi) hold is an epistemic object. Now we have all the elements to give the definition of quasimodels.
Definition 6.8. (Quasimodel)
A quasimodel for φ is a tuple Q = F, f, O such that f is a state function over F and (i) φ ∈ t, for some t ∈ T n j and T n j ∈ C n j ;
(ii) every pair (C n j , C n+1 j ) is -suitable, and if n j ≺ l n ′ j ′ then C n j and C n ′ j ′ are l-suitable;
(iii) for every t ∈ T n j there exists an object ρ ∈ O such that ρ(n j ) = t;
(iv) for every c ∈ conφ the function ρ c such that ρ c (n j ) = t for t, c ∈ T con n j is an object in O.
As the first step in the completeness proof we show that for monodic formulas satisfability in quasimodels implies satisfability in Kripke models. Lemma 6.1. If a monodic formula φ ∈ L 1 m has a quasimodel Q, then φ is satisfiable in a Kripke model.
Proof:
The proof of this lemma is similar to those of Lemmas 11.72 and 12.9 in [6] . First of all, for every monodic formula ψ ∈ L 1 m of the form K i χ, Dχ, Cχ, χ, or χ 1 Uχ 2 , if ψ is a sentence then we introduce a propositional variable p ψ and p ψ is the surrogate of ψ, if x is the only free variable in ψ then we introduce a unary predicative letter P 1 ψ and the formula P 1 ψ (x) is the surrogate of ψ. Given a formula φ ∈ L 1 m we denote by φ the formula obtained from φ by substituting all its modal subformulas that are not within the scope of another modal operator with their surrogates.
Since every state candidate C in the quasimodel Q is consistent and the system QKT 1 m is based on first-order logic, the formula α C is consistent with first-order (non-modal) logic. As a consequence, by completeness of first-order logic, there is a first-order structure I = I, D where D is a non-empty set of individuals and I is an interpretation on D, which satisfies α C , that is, I σ |= α C for some assignment σ to D. Now consider a cardinal κ ≥ ℵ 0 greater than the cardinality of the set O of all objects in Q and define D = { ρ, ξ | ρ ∈ O, ξ < κ}. By the theory of first-order logic, we can assume without loss of generality that D is the domain of the first-order structure I n j = I n j , D satisfying α Cn j , that is, all the structures I n j share a common domain D. Moreover, we can assume that for every t ∈ T n j , ρ, ξ ∈ D, ρ(n j ) = t iff I σ n j |= t[x] for σ(x) = ρ, ξ , and I n j (c) = ρ, 0 for every c ∈ conφ. Let us now define the Kripke model M. Let F = N j , < j j∈J , {≺ l } l∈A + be the frame of the quasimodel Q, we define M as N j , < j j∈J , {R i } i∈A , D, I where each sequence N j of naturals in F belongs also to M; each relation R i is the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of ≺ i ∪ ≺ D ; D is defined as above; and the interpretation I is obtained by gluing together the various I n j .
By induction on the length of ψ ∈ sub x φ we can show that for every assignment σ,
The base of induction follows by the definition of I. The step for propositional connectives and quantifiers follows by the induction hypothesis and equations
To deal with modal operators we state the following remark; the relevant cases directly follow.
Remark 6.1. For every ρ ∈ O and n j ∈ N j
The proof of this remark is similar to the one of Lemma 12.10 in [6] . To complete the proof of Lemma 6.1 we remark that by definition of quasimodel φ ∈ t, for some t ∈ T n j and T n j ∈ C n j , therefore we obtain that φ is satisfied in the Kripke model M.
⊓ ⊔ Note that if Q is a synchronous quasimodel for φ, then the Kripke model built from Q in Theorem 6.1 is also synchronous. Now it is left to prove the existence of such a quasimodel for φ.
m is a consistent monodic formula, then there exists a (synchronous) quasimodel for φ.
In the proof we use the following partial results. These lemmas, which we state without proof, are modifications of Lemmas 11.73 and 12.11 in [6] . Lemma 6.3. Let C be a consistent state candidate, then we can construct an infinite sequence {C n } n∈N of state candidates such that C = C 0 and (i) every pair (C n , C n+1 ) is -suitable;
(ii) for every t ∈ T n there exists a temporal object ρ such that ρ(n) = t; (iii) for every c ∈ conφ the function ρ c such that ρ c (n) = t, for t, c ∈ T con n , is a temporal object.
Lemma 6.4. If C is a consistent state candidate, then we can construct a structure W = W, ≺ 1 , . . . , ≺ m , ≺ D such that W is a non-empty set of state candidates, and the pair W, l∈A + ≺ l is a tree. Furthermore, (i) C ≺ l C ′ only if C and C ′ are l-suitable;
(ii) for every t ∈ T , w ∈ W , there exists an epistemic object ρ such that ρ(w) = t;
(iii) for every c ∈ conφ the function ρ c such that ρ c (w) = t, for t, c ∈ T con w , is an epistemic object.
We can now prove Lemma 6.2.
but now we define the state function f 2n+1 such that f 2n+1 ((m + k) u ) = u k for k ∈ N. It it not difficult to show that by this construction the quasimodel Q for φ is synchronous. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.1. ⊓ ⊔ By combining Lemmas 6.2 and 6.1 we can state the main result of this paper.
Theorem 6.1. (Completeness)
The system QKT 1 m is complete with respect to the class QIS of quantified interpreted systems.
Assume that φ, then ¬φ is consistent and by Lemmas 6.2 and 6.1 there is a Kripke model M satisfying ¬φ. By Lemma 5.1 the QIS g(M) does not validate φ, therefore QIS |= φ. The following result can be proved similarly.
Theorem 6.2. (Completeness)
The system QKT 1 m is complete with respect to the class QIS sync of synchronous QIS.
Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper we analysed a quantified version of interpreted systems, the typical formalism for temporal epistemic logic in multi-agent systems, and proved completeness for the system QKT 1 m defined on the monodic fragment of the first-order language L m that includes linear-time modalities and epistemic operators for group knowledge. This result makes use of previous contributions on the axiomatisation of first-order epistemic and temporal logic [25, 29] . Further, we showed that a wide range of specifications on message passing systems can be expressed in the monodic fragment of L m .
Still, further work is needed in this line of research. The present paper deals with the class QIS of all quantified interpreted systems and the class QIS sync of synchronous QIS. In the axiomatisation QKT 1 m for these classes there is no interaction between temporal and epistemic operators, but interaction is essential to express epistemic concepts such as perfect recall and no learning. These refinements have been widely studied at the propositional level [8, 10] , but it is not clear to which extent these results apply to the first order.
Finally, another issue not tackled in this paper is decidability. We believe that by combining the techniques in [15, 28] it is likely to find decidable monodic fragments of first-order temporal epistemic logic. However, this topic demands further investigations.
